Case 1:13-cv-03405-DLC Document 128 Filed 06/28/16 Page 1 of 20

G5GQJENc 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 NORMAN JENKINS 3 Plaintiff 4 5 13 CV 3405 (KPF) v. Telephone Conference 6 POLICE OFFICER VICTOR CHARLES, et al., 7 Defendants 8 9 New York, N.Y. May 16, 2016 10:00 a.m. 10 Before: 11 12 HON. KATHERINE POLK FAILLA 13 District Judge 14 TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES 15 NORMAN JENKINS, Pro Se 16 NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT Attorney for Defendants 17 TAVIS C. DEATLEY DANIEL L. PASSESER 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1 (In chambers; case called)

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Deatley and Mr. Passeser. This is Judge Failla. Do I have you both on the line?

MR. DEATLEY: You do. Good morning, your Honor.

MR. PASSESER: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think Mr. Deatley was relaying information to my deputy. At the risk of making you repeat yourself, I'm wondering, sir, if you could tell me what you told him. I have a court reporter here making sure it's all being taken down.

MR. DEATLEY: Of course, your Honor. Thank you.

Mr. Passeser and I around 9:58, 9:59 called the Department of

Corrections to the number provided by legal to contact an

individual by the name of Ms. Mora, who is the social services

coordinator for ENTC, which is the building that plaintiff

Norman Jenkins is housed on on Rikers Island.

Speaking to Ms. Mora, she informed us that plaintiff was unavailable for the conference at this time as he had gotten into some sort of altercation, whether that be only verbal or also physical, with corrections officers on Rikers Island who were attempting to take him to the conference.

She informed us that a captain was being sought, and in possibly the next 10 to 15 minutes she would call us back or we could call her if they hadn't heard from her with an update

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as to whether or not Mr. Jenkins was willing or available for the conference, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Deatley and Mr. Passeser, let me let you know that in the last week, I believe Thursday, Friday of last week -- wait. I'm going to interrupt myself because Mr. Lopez has news for me.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: It's my understanding that Mr. Jenkins is on the line with Ally.

THE COURT: Well, that is going to be interesting. have apparently Mr. Jenkins on the other line. Gentlemen, let me let you know what I was going to say while my law clerk keeps Mr. Jenkins occupied. That is, that both Mr. Jenkins' girlfriend and Mr. Jenkins' cousin separately reached out to me last week to let me know that he believed that he was being harassed by Rikers Island officials, that he was being abused by them, and that he believed they were going to prevent him from participating in this call today.

I did not take this to you. I was going to bring it up at today's call because I did not know if he was going to be prevented, but he is now on the line. So perhaps the thing for me to do, gentlemen, is to put you on hold, and I will do that. So stay there. We'll get right back to you.

MR. DEATLEY: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, this is again Judge Failla.

Thank you for your patience. What my law clerk just relayed to me was that Mr. Jenkins had said to her that he had only approximately three minutes remaining on his permissible call time, that he's being harassed by individuals at Rikers Island, and that he asked that I try and find some way of permitting him to participate in this call.

Immediately thereafter, as that information was being relayed to me, the line on which his call came in went dead, which suggests he's not on the phone any more. We're looking to see whether he calls back. I don't really know what to do.

Mr. Deatley, the woman, Ms. Mora, with whom you spoke, is she akin to a unit counselor or someone who helps facilitate phone calls of this type?

MR. PASSESER: The latter, your Honor. At least, yes, she does help facilitate phone calls of this type.

THE COURT: And that's Mr. Passeser, correct?

MR. PASSESER: Yes.

THE COURT: Perhaps I should try and speak with

Ms. Mora so we can perhaps find a time, which may not be today,
when we can have this call because I am concerned about

Mr. Jenkins for the same reasons I was concerned when he was
last before me in December. I will tell you that the phone
calls I am receiving suggest information being relayed by
someone with some emotional issues.

MR. PASSESER: Your Honor, we can provide you the

number that Ms. Mora provided us to reach out to her if you would like to speak with her directly.

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. PASSESER: (718) 546-5803. Unfortunately, we do not know her first name, but it's Mora, M-O-R-A.

THE COURT: I presume, gentlemen, you will be around this week. Is that correct?

MR. PASSESER: Unfortunately, your Honor, I am out of the office Thursday and Friday, but I'm available all day on Tuesday and Wednesday.

THE COURT: And I begin a trial tomorrow so we will see what we can do. I am not sure we can reconstitute everybody today for a call, although we'd certainly like to. Let me find out what's going on.

Please know that these allegations are out there; that he is being consistently harassed at Rikers because the guards at Rikers are aware of this case. Now, there are a number of perhaps logical jumps that one has to make, but that is what's been relayed to me in two very frantic calls by individuals close to Mr. Jenkins.

MR. DEATLEY: Yes, your Honor.

MR. PASSESER: Understood.

THE COURT: Thank you both for participating in the call. Could you please get a transcript of this call so we have a record of this proceeding?

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               MR. DEATLEY: Yes, your Honor. If your Honor prefers,
      Dan and I, Mr. Passeser and I, will stand by for the next 30
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     minutes to an hour or so if your Honor is able to get
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     Mr. Jenkins on the line.
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               THE COURT: I do appreciate that. Thank you.
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               MR. DEATLEY: Thank you, your Honor.
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               (Recess)
               THE DEPUTY CLERK: In the matter of Norman Jenkins v.
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      Police Officer Charles, et al. If the parties could state
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      their names, please.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Jenkins, are you on the line?
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               MR. JENKINS: Yes, ma'am.
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               THE COURT: Good morning, sir. This is Judge Failla.
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      Is it Mr. Deatley and Mr. Passeser for the corporation counsel?
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               MR. DEATLEY: Yes, it is, your Honor. Good morning.
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               MR. PASSESER: Good morning.
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               THE COURT: Good morning to all of you.
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      have this call, and I thank you for participating in it because
      I wanted to address a motion for reconsideration and relief
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      from final judgment that Mr. Jenkins has filed with me.
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               Let me remind the parties that there is some
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     procedural history here. I did dismiss the case that
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     Mr. Jenkins had brought on December 11 of last year based on
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      failure to prosecute.
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On February 10 of this year, Mr. Jenkins filed a

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motion for reconsideration for dismissal of the case. I am interpreting this as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I reviewed the parties' briefing, I've looked at the arguments; and for the reasons I am about to outline, I am granting Mr. Jenkins' motion, and I am restoring this case to the docket.

Mr. Jenkins, I am construing this as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b). Because it's been filed more than 14 days after the entry of my judgment, I am also, sir, because I must, broadly construe the allegations and the claims you are making because of your pro se status.

Now, the defendants have argued, understandably, that this matter is untimely under Local Rule 6.3, which is a motion for reconsideration. I have not seen a similar argument that this motion when construed under Rule 60(b) is considered untimely. The standard here is that motions be filed within a reasonable time, and because this is @60(b)(1), (2) or (3), no more than one year after judgment.

Under the particular facts of this case, I am finding that this period does not exceed the reasonable period that is required by Rule 60(b). I am balancing here the interest in the finality of the judgments versus the reasons for the delay. I am also mindful of the fact that Rule 60(b) motions are not

to be used as an end-run around, for example, notices of appeal deadlines which are 30 days out or the reconsideration deadlines that are 14 days out. I am understanding this to be a motion under excusable neglect, which is a more flexible standard.

The plaintiff has contended to me that his attorneys remained engaged as his counsel after I dismissed the case but then abandoned the litigation, and he filed the motion pro se after which his counsel finally withdrew. In light of the broken relationship between Mr. Jenkins and his counsel — and I certainly saw that firsthand at trial — and counsel's failure to proceed or withdraw, I am inclined to consider the delay as excusable neglect. I have not seen a suggestion that the delay in filing this motion brings prejudice to the defendants.

Now, there is a second level, and a more important level, of excusable neglect that is being argued by Mr. Jenkins. He is arguing to me that when he arrived late in the courthouse on that day of trial, that that itself was excusable neglect. Given that, I'm looking at the elements the Second Circuit considers which are the danger of the prejudice to the non-movant, the length of the delay and its possible effect on court proceedings, the reason for the delay and whether the movant here, Mr. Jenkins, acted in good faith.

I am looking in particular at the Second Circuit's

decision in American Express Financial Advisors Securities

Litigation, a 2011 decision that's reported at 672 F. 3d 113,

and that in turn comes from or is based on, I think, the case
that sort of started it all, Pioneer Investment Services

Company v. Brunswick Associated Limited Partnership, a Supreme
Court decision from 1993.

On the issue of prejudice, the defendants have argued to me that the plaintiff's delay at trial significantly prejudiced them as he twice failed to appear on time and that his outburst in court resulted in the second day of trial being adjourned. I agree, but ultimately this amounts to a minor inconvenience. The behavior of Mr. Jenkins, at most, would have added a day or so to the trial schedule, and I don't believe I can say that that caused prejudice to the defendants sufficient to warrant the very extreme dismissal under Rule 41 that I adopted. Also, though plaintiff was tardy, and he was on the 8th of December, I was able to address with the parties legal matters thereby defraying some of the loss of time and lessening some of the prejudice to the defendants.

The same with the delay on the 9th of December.

The next, and perhaps bigger issue, is the length of the delay. The tardiness on the first day really didn't alter the trial day, but on the third day of trial he was 45 to 50 minutes late, and that did throw off the trial schedule. But I'm not sure that I can say it was so bad that the Second

Circuit would agree with me that it is a basis for dismissal.

More than that, I am aware that at the moment I was getting ready to dismiss the case, I received word from counsel,

Mr. Oliver, for the plaintiff that he was on his way and caught in a subway in transit. The defendant has also asserted that the plaintiff has not presented a good reason for the failure to timely appear, as he's asserted only the parole curfew and family responsibilities, and neither of these would have prevented him from appearing on time.

I guess the issue is, on the day in question when I dismissed the case, I had moved the start time up to 8:30 upon receiving notice the preceding afternoon that plaintiff's counsel intended to move to withdraw. At the time I set this earlier time, I was not aware of the nature of Mr. Jenkins' parole conditions and the fact that he had gotten permission to assist or to take his son to school but not necessarily to come early to court, and that he was already struggling to arrive at court in a timely manner. I believe Mr. Jenkins had communicated this information to his counsel. I don't know that they had really effectively relayed that information to me.

To be clear, the attorneys' mistake or the inability to efficiently manage the case load is not necessarily grounds for excusable neglect, but here, there was a real problem between counsel and the client at this time. There was an

outburst in the court on the 8th of December. There was the expressed intention to move to withdraw. There was a motion on this regard, and, very clearly, relations had broken down between Mr. Jenkins and his counsel. I do not think that the failure of his counsel to tell me this information about his child obligations until the moment I was dismissing the case, I don't think that was an error of law. I don't think it was a legal strategy. I think it was a failure to communicate information that I probably should have had beforehand, and I think it is indicative of the breakdown of the relationship.

I also am not fully clear as to when Mr. Jenkins was made aware of the 8:30 starting time, and the submissions to the Court that he has made in connection with this motion indicate that he believed the start time to be at 9:00 a.m., and then he thought maybe it was an 8:45 time, but that he tried his hardest to get there, and he was.

So, in summary, a combination of the lack of advance notice of the precise start time, the parole conditions and certain, but not entire, exceptions to them, which the Court was only belatedly made aware of, provide some justification for plaintiff's delay. When viewed alongside the lack of prejudice to defendants, comparatively speaking, and the insubstantial duration of the delay, this factor too weighs in favor of relief.

Let me put this more clearly. At the time I dismissed

this case, I believed I had much broader discretion than I had. I have looked at a number of Second Circuit cases, and they make very clear to me that when someone is late by less than an hour, and particularly where the judge knows where he is and knows where he is going, that the judge errs and abuses her discretion in dismissing the case on that basis. And so in addition to finding a basis in the law to grant relief under 60(b) based on the arguments that Mr. Jenkins has made to me, I am on some level saving the parties an appellate issue that is very likely to be decided in Mr. Jenkins' favor. I am not going to say, and there is no evidence, that Mr. Jenkins has acted in bad faith.

For all of these reasons, I am restoring the case to the docket; but lest there be any appearance of partiality or impropriety, particularly given the nature of the outburst on the 8th of December and the fact that a portion of that outburst was directed at me, I am going to transfer the case to another judge.

So let me end with this: I will not have this case in the next day or so. It will be restored to my calendar and transferred to someone else, and at that time, Mr. Jenkins can figure out when it makes sense to talk about a retrial in this matter, and the other things attendant to that. But I want to speak to Mr. Jenkins not as a judge, because I will no longer have this case, and I am not speaking as someone with an

interest in this case. I am speaking to him as a human being.

Mr. Jenkins, that trial was very stressful for you, sir. I know it was, and I saw how much of a strain it was on you. When this case comes back before a different judge, I would ask you -- I cannot instruct you -- I am simply asking you to think about whether you want to proceed with the trial because it was such a strain on you. I will also suggest to anyone -- anyone being the judge -- who receives this case from me, that they determine whether it is appropriate to appoint pro bono counsel to assist you in this case. That may not be appropriate, but I leave it to their discretion.

I am saying, sir, I actually thought on some level I did you a favor in dismissing this case. I know you want it back, but I want you to think about whether that's the best thing for your mental and emotional health.

With all of that, gentlemen, I thank you for listening to me. I will ask Mr. Deatley and Mr. Passeser to get a transcript of this. Again, I thank you for the work you did on the case and the work that I know you will do on the case and for your time this morning. Thank you all

MR. DEATLEY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. PASSESER: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. JENKINS: Can I say something?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Jenkins.

MR. JENKINS: Yeah, basically parole is still

harassing me. You know, this was the whole thing that I was basically trying to point out in the reconsideration that after you dismissed it, they basically were going to put disclaimers on me and all that. I'm going from through the same thing that was being hid from you. Like everything that I sent to you was being hid. What happened on August 16 when my retainer lawyer went inside a parole hearing and hid the fact that they called the wrong police officer that wouldn't show, the fact that the police report that was used was a fake police report.

Now, after it was dismissed, I'm locked up again. I haven't committed a crime. They locking me up for failure — for saying I failed to report, and that I — I tested positive for cocaine. I have proof from a drug program that I didn't use cocaine. And they harassing me here. They try to prohibit me now just to try to get the phone just now. It's like everybody's in my business. It's like I'm in harm's way right now. And this parole has no jurisdiction over me. What they did back then, for them to continue to even try to supervise me and sanction me or anything is a violation of my constitutional rights.

And I understand that you walking away -- you want to walk away from this case, but I'm being prosecuted right now for what happened on August 10 -- I mean, pardon me, on May 22, 2010. I have two parole officers that threaten my liberty and threaten me not to pursue what I'm pursuing right now. And I'm

in the Department of Corrections, and they basically harassing me. Officers, they took my ID from me, took my money out of my account, illegally they took the money out of my account, took my ID and they told my I'm not going to make this call Monday, they're going to make sure I don't make this call Monday.

When I went to the parole hearing, you said that you inquired whether or not this had anything to do with my case. I'm in front of the same people, the same judge that did that. The parole specialist is now the deputy chairman. She did the exact same thing. She's altering the documents. I have proof. I have all the documents she gave to me. They switched judges on me. I have one judge that was going to allow to see the parole officer to come in because I have pictures to show that.

THE COURT: Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Jenkins, I need you to slow down, sir. You are going so fast. I'm not taking down everything you're saying. Go a little bit slower.

MR. JENKINS: All right. So when I was arrested, I'm doing the preliminary hearing. So when I went to the preliminary hearing, I was in front of a judge. When the judge asked me, I said I want to talk to the parole officer, so he adjourned it so I could see the parole officer. Leila Short, the same one on August 16 comes in on my parole where she switches up and sends the same judge back that doesn't allow for me to call this witness and basically finds me guilty of not reporting. One time — out of being on parole for eight

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years, I don't report not one time, and you find probable cause saying that they come back with the other charges. switch judges on me three times, a presiding judge where I already pointed out to them, yo, listen, this is illegal. the Judge Landis that I pointed out to him, like, yo, listen, you illegally sat on my final hearing when you wasn't supposed It was supposed to be the Judge Vilitrani. I showed him the civil rules of why you can't just come on a case and qualify the case, and a judge can't substitute himself. He basically pushed my date all the way back to the 31st and started asking me questions, am I going to sue him? Am I going to sue him? I was like this has nothing to do with it. has something to do with parole. And right now every proceeding that you're doing is illegal, and I'm asking them to cut me loose, to cut my loose. You don't have no jurisdiction over me no more, none whatsoever. You relinquished that. You can't continue to supervise me -- you can't say you didn't see -- August 16, admitted right there, that's what the defendants and my lawyers was hiding from me. I didn't get that until attorney Gideon gave me a hard drive. downloaded the hard drive, it had all these minutes in it that I been saying for the longest -- I didn't even have a chance to present it in a writ of habeas corpus and a Article 78 because they hid it. I didn't get it to Oliver. He gave it to me. Ιt was Boyle's hard drive. They knew that. Then on top of that

when they requested me for the deposition and asked me did I file a 50-h hearing, I said no. Boyle was right there that I didn't have a 50-h hearing, but then when I get his paperwork, when he gives me paperwork, I see where they did call me for a 50-h and he put in a lawsuit and he muted it by saying that I was locked up on Rikers Island. Rikers Island delivers. They produce who you need to go to a 50-h hearing, and he never told me about that.

THE COURT: Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Jenkins.

Again, sir, I want you to slow down, but let me speak for a moment. What I am understanding you to say is that right now you believe you should not be at Rikers Island because you believe that your term of parole was discharged and they had no basis to violate you. Do I understand that correctly, sir?

MR. JENKINS: That's what I'm saying, ma'am. They had no basis to violate me. None. They made up all that stuff.

They made up everything, and they've been harassing me since

I--

THE COURT: Two different things. Not whether they had a basis to violate you. I understood you to be saying that they don't even have -- that your time of supervision is done. Is that correct?

MR. JENKINS: OK. I want to explain why I said that, why I'm saying that.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. JENKINS: OK. Why I'm saying that, right, is that when -- when they locked me -- when they maliciously prosecuted me, right, and pushed me past the three years that I supposed to have, that when you do three years of unprovoked parole, they got to cut you loose, right. They got to cut you loose. And the fact that they was involved in illegally incarcerating me, they can't make me do another three years of unprovoked parole because you deny me equal protection of the law. You deny me my constitutional rights. The only remedy that they have is to discharge me on parole, but they continue to sanction me. They continue to parole me, and I've been bringing this to their attention since 2011.

THE COURT: Slow down, sir. Slow down, sir.

Mr. Deatley or Mr. Passeser, do you have knowledge of the maximum expiration date of Mr. Jenkins' parole term?

MR. DEATLEY: Yes, we do, your Honor. On the DOCCS inmate lookup website, which I'm pulling up at the moment, I could provide you with the exact date; but upon information and belief from looking this morning, it's sometime in 2017, your Honor.

THE COURT: I see. So, your position, sir, is that if there is a basis to violate Mr. Jenkins -- and I'm not necessarily saying there is -- they have the ability to do that. It's not as though they lack jurisdiction because his time of supervision has ended.

MR. DEATLEY: The DOCCS inmate lookup -- that's correct, your Honor, the inmate lookup page we just logged onto says the maximum expiration date for Mr. Jenkins' parole is July 27, 2017.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DEATLEY: Now, whether that date is correct or -- that's not something we're aware of.

THE COURT: I understand.

Mr. Jenkins, sir, I understand what you're saying. You're saying a couple of things. Number one, you feel that your time of supervision should have ended by now.

The second thing you're saying is the basis for your current violation and the incarceration that comes with it is not legitimate. This I understand.

And then you've also said that while you have been housed at Rikers, people have treated you unfairly because of the case before me.

Do I understand that correctly, sir?

MR. JENKINS: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Sir, I understand that. I am going to look into it to the extent that I can. I did talk to people at the time you were surrendering for this violation, and I will also be attuned to whatever judge gets this case, I will make sure that I have a very detailed conversation with them about what we're talking about today, and I will make sure they get a

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copy of the transcript that is being prepared as we speak. I
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      do understand your issues, sir, so I will look into that.
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               MR. JENKINS: Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Thank you all.
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               MR. DEATLEY: Thank you, your Honor.
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               (Adjourned)
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